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COMMERCIAL LAW
OVERVIEW
During the period covered by this survey, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals selected for publication several Truth in Lending decisions along
with decisions in other areas of commercial law, including bankruptcy and
secured transactions. A discussion of the Truth in Lending cases dominates
this section.
Only opinions selected for official publication are reviewed here. Few of
the decisions in the survey period represent major developments or dramatic
changes in the law. However, a number of the decisions are noteworthy
because of the isolated application of the law or the particular facts of the
cases.
I. TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
Mean'ngful Disclosure
James v. Ford Motor Credit Co. I and its companion case, Hernandez v. O'Neal
Motors, Inc.,2 consider what constitutes meaningful disclosure under the
Truth in Lending Act.3 In these cases the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered whether failure to disclose the right of the seller to a returned and
unearned insurance premium is a violation of the requirement for disclosure
of a security interest pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation
Z.4 Specifically at issue were automobile installment contracts. The Tenth
Circuit held there was no violation.
In James, the plaintiffs, Colorado residents, purchased a pickup truck
and executed an installment purchase contract, which was assigned to Ford
Motor Credit Co.5 Insurance on damage to the vehicle was part of the
credit transaction. The insurance charge was specifically noted on the face
of the contract and was included in the total amount to be repaid in
monthly installments. 6 Paragraph thirteen of the signed face page of the
contract 7 provided that the seller would have a security interest under the
Uniform Commercial Code in the property (the pickup truck) and in the
proceeds thereof to secure the payment, in cash, of the total of the install-
ment payments. Paragraph fifteen of the signed face page provided that the
terms and conditions on the reverse side of the contract were incorporated by
1. 638 F.2d 147 (10th Cir. 1980), cerl. granted, 101 S. Ct. 3134 (1981).
2. 638 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated and remandedinpart, cert. denied n part, 101 S. Ct.
3134 (1981).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976).
4. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1981).
5. 638 F.2d at 148.
6. Id. at 150.
7. Paragraph 13 of the contract provided: "Security Interest: Seller shall have a security
interest under the Uniform Commercial Code in the Property (described above) and to the
proceeds thereof to secure the payment in cash of the Total of Payments and all other amounts
due or to become due thereunder." Id. at 148.
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reference. 8 Finally, paragraph eighteen on the reverse side of the contract9
contained an express assignment from the buyer to the seller of insurance
proceeds, including returned or unearned premiums.
The plaintiffs-purchasers sued for the statutory liability and attorneys'
fees provided for under the Truth in Lending Act,' 0 claiming that the as-
signment of the returned and unearned portion of the insurance premium
was a security interest11 under section 4-9-102 of the Colorado Uniform
Commercial Code.1 2 Thus, the purchasers contended that the putative se-
curity interest should have been disclosed on the signed face page of the
installment purchase contract, pursuant to Regulation Z.' 3 The district
court rejected this contention. 14 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that
there was no violation of the requirement for disclosure of a security interest
because the installment credit contract provided: 1) the seller had a security
interest in the pickup truck and the proceeds thereof; 2) the buyer assigned
to the seller any monies payable under the insurance policy including re-
turned or unearned premiums; and 3) the amount financed included the
insurance premium. 15
A superficial reading of James would suggest that no new principle of
law was established by this case. As Judge Doyle pointed out in a dissenting
opinion, however,James represents a distinct departure from the conclusions
of the Third,' 6 Fifth,' 7 and Seventh' 8 Circuit Courts of Appeals that the
nondisclosure of the seller's right to unearned and returned insurance premi-
ums is a violation of the Truth in Lending Act, subjecting the seller to the
8. Id.
9. Paragraph 18 of the contract provided in pertinent part:
Buyer hereby assigns to Seller any monies payable under such insurance, by whom-
ever obtained, including returned or unearned premiums, and Seller hereby is author-
ized on behalf of both Buyer and Seller to receive or collect same .... The proceeds
from such insurance, by whomever obtained, shall be applied toward replacement of
the Property or payment of the indebtedness hereunder in the sole discretion of the
Seller.
Id.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976). Failure to properly disclose the required information sub-
jects the offender to a civil liability in an amount equal to the sum of actual damages sustained
as a result of the failure plus not more than $1,000 plus reasonable attorneys' fees.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(10) (1976). The Truth in Lending Act requires the disclosure of
"[a] description of any security interest held or to be retained or acquired by the creditor in
connection with the extension of credit, and a clear identification of the property to which the
security interest relates." Although the Truth in Lending Act does not define "security" or
"security interest," Regulation Z provides in pertinent part: " 'Security interest' and 'security'
mean any interest in property which secures payment or performance of an obligation. The
terms include, but are not limited to, security interests under the Uniform Commercial
Code .. " 12 C.F.R. § 2 2 6 .2(gg) (1981).
12. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 4-9-102 (1973).
13. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(a) (1981) provides that all required disclosures be made on either:
"(1) The note or other instrument evidencing the obligation on the same side of the page and
above the place for the customer's signature; or (2) One side of a separate statement which
identifies the transaction."
14. 638 F.2d at 148.
15. Id. at 150.
16. See Gennuso v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 566 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1977).
17. See Edmondson v. Allen-Russell Ford, Inc., 577 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 951 (1979).
18. See Valencia v. Anderson Bros. Ford, 617 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. An-
derson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 101 S. Ct. 2266 (1981).
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prescribed statutory liability. '9 The Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuit cases
viewed the assignment of a returned or unearned insurance premium as a
security interest. Therefore, for purposes of Regulation Z and the Truth in
Lending Act, such a security interest had to be disclosed. Each of the three
circuit court cases ruled that a general provision stating that the "Seller shall
have a security interest under the Uniform Commercial Code in the Prop-
erty (the automobile] and in the proceeds thereof. ."20 was not an ade-
quate disclosure to the consumer.
Injames, the Tenth Circuit found the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuit
cases inapposite because enactment of the Truth in Lending Simplification
and Reform Act 2 1 amended the disclosure section of the Truth in Lending
Act.2 2 The language of the amended section calls for disclosure of the prin-
cipal property that provides the security for a loan but does not require a
listing of related or incidental interests in the property, such as insurance
proceeds or unearned insurance premiums.2 3 The Tenth Circuit relied ex-
tensively on the legislative history accompanying the amendment in reach-
ing its holding injames.
The appellate court's holding in James was also influenced by dictum in
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milholin,2 4 a 1980 United States Supreme Court case.
The Court stated in Mi/hollin that meaningful disclosure cannot be applied
in the abstract and is not synonymous with more disclosure. 25 The Tenth
Circuit thus concluded that the Truth in Lending Act does not require, nor
did Congress intend for the Act to require, the disclosure on the face of an
installment contract of the seller's right to the return of an unearned insur-
ance premium.
It is significant that the United States Supreme Court recently reversed
the Seventh Circuit's holding that an assignment of unearned insurance pre-
miums in a consumer credit installment contract is a security interest for
purposes of disclosure under the Truth in Lending Act. 26 In a five to four
decision, the Court announced a holding identical to that of the Tenth Cir-
19. 638. F.2d at 151-52 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
20. 577 F.2d at 295.
21. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 601, 94 Stat. 168 (1966) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1602).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a) (1976).
23. S. REP. No. 368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, repr nntd t [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 266. With reference to amendment of the disclosure requirements of § 1638(a), the Sen-
ate Report states:
The security interest disclosure is also simplified to eliminate the technical disclosure
of the type of security interest taken. When a security interest is being taken in prop-
erty purchased as part of the credit transaction, this section requires a statement that a
security interest has been or will be taken in the property purchased. When a security
interest is being taken in property not purchased as part of the credit transaction, the
Committee intends this provision to require a listing by item or type of the property
securing the transaction, but not a listing of related or incidental interests in the prop-
erty. For example, a loan secured by an automobile (not being purchased with the
proceeds of the loan) would require a statement indicating that the loan is secured by
an automobile but would not require a listing of incidental or related rights which the
creditor may have such as insurance proceeds or unearned insurance premiums, rights
arising under, or waived in accord with state law, accessions, accessories or proceeds.
24. 444 U.S. 555 (1980).
25. Id. at 568.
26. Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 101 S. Ct. 2266 (1981).
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cuit in James: an assignment of unearned insurance premiums does not cre-
ate a security interest that must be disclosed pursuant to the Truth in
Lending Act. 27 In reaching its holding, the Court pointed to the Federal
Reserve Board's revision of Regulation Z to expressly exclude "incidental
interests" such as interests in insurance proceeds or premium rebates from
the definition of a security interest.
28
Hernandez v. O'Neal Motors, Inc.29 raised the identical issue posed in
James. The Tenth Circuit held that the outcome of Hernandez was governed
by the court's decision inJames.30 Judge Doyle filed a dissenting opinion
based upon his dissent inJames.
3 1
Not all cases involving the Truth in Lending Act turn on esoteric facts
nor on latent disclosure defects. In Yazzte v. Renolds,32 a creditor endeavored
to avoid the intricacies of the Truth in Lending Act and nearly succeeded.
Despite the district court's disposition of the case on defendant's motion for
summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded having found
well-defined issues of fact precluding summary judgment.
33
Suit was brought on behalf of five plaintiffs who purchased cars on an
installment payment basis from defendant Reynolds.34 The plaintiffs-pur-
chasers claimed that Reynolds violated the Truth in Lending Act 35 and
Regulation Z36 by failing to disclose a finance charge and to express it as an
annual percentage rate when, in fact, a finance charge was imposed on credit
customers.
37
Reynolds' company, Ben's Auto Sales, was engaged in the retail sale of
used cars. Nearly ninety-eight percent of the company's sales were pursuant
to installment contracts which provided for four or more payments payable
on a prearranged schedule. 38 The same printed form contract was used in
each sale to the several plaintiffs. Each contract contained the following
statement: "Buyer .. .having been quoted both a time sale price and a
lesser cash price hereby purchased from Seller on a time price basis. . . the
27. Id. at 2273.
28. Id. at 2271.
29. 638 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded in part, cert. dened in part, 101 S. Ct.
3134 (1981).
30. Id. at 154-55.
31. Id. at 155 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
32. 623 F.2d 638 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 449 U.S. 982 (1980).
33. Id. at 643.
34. Id. at 639.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1976) requires the amount of the finance charge "imposed di-
rectly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to the extension of credit" to be determined by
including any of the following:
(1) Interest, time price differential, and any amount payable under a point, discount,
or other system or additional charges.
(2) Service or carrying charge.
(3) Loan fee, finder's fee, or similar charge.
(4) Fee for an investigation or credit report.
(5) Premium or other charge for any guarantee or insurance protecting the creditor
against the obligor's default or other credit loss.
Id.
36. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (1981).




following property . . ."39 At no time did Reynolds quote to the purchas-
ers two different prices. In fact, the prices quoted as the "cash price" and the
"deferred payment price" in the contracts were the same. Further, Reynolds
did not quote or charge any of his customers different prices according to the
payment terms. Each of the contracts in Yazzie disclosed the finance charge
and the annual percentage rate as zero.40
The Tenth Circuit concluded that Reynolds' single-price sales approach
tended to show that the defendant sought to conceal the cost of credit in
order to circumvent the Truth in Lending Act.
4 '
II. BANKRUPTCY
Retroactive application of section 522(0(2) of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act4 2 is unconstitutional, the Tenth Circuit held in Rodrock v. Security Indus-
trial Bank .43
Rodrock consolidated seven cases44 where debtors appealed from judg-
ments of the United States Bankruptcy Courts dismissing complaints for lien
avoidance under section 522(f)(2) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
(the Reform Act). 45 Each of the debtors claimed a personal property exemp-
tion and sought to avoid secured creditors' non-possessory, non-purchase
money security interests in the items of personal property that served as
collateral."
The principal issue in the case was whether section 522(f)(2) of the Re-
form Act applies retroactively to security interests that attached prior to the
effective date of the Reform Act,4 7 in instances where debtors instituted
bankruptcy proceedings after the effective date of the Reform Act. The
Tenth Circuit concluded that Congress intended for substantive provisions
of the Act, such as section 522(0(2), to be applied retroactively-governing
security interests that came into being before the effective date of the Reform
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 642-43.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
43. 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3479 (Dec. 15, 1981).
44. Five of the seven cases were direct appeals from judgments entered in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Two of the cases were direct appeals from
judgments entered in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas. 642 F.2d
at 1195.
45. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (Supp. III 1979) provides:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien
on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemp-
tion to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section,
if such lien is: (I) a judicial lien; or (2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security
interest in any: (A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appli-
ances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily
for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor,
(B) implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a
dependent of the debtor; or (C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or
a dependent of the debtor.
46. 642 F.2d at 1195.
47. The effective date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was October 1, 1979.
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Act.48 However, the Tenth Circuit was unwilling to apply section 522(0(2)
retroactively without launching a constitutional inquiry.
In reaching its holding that retroactive application of the section is un-
constitutional, the Tenth Circuit was influenced by a 1935 United States
Supreme Court case, Louz'vtlle Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford.49  The
Supreme Court held in Radford that: 1) the bankruptcy power is subject to
the fifth amendment; and 2) although Congress may, under the bankruptcy
power, discharge a debtor's personal obligation, Congress cannot take for the
benefit of the debtor rights in specific property acquired by a creditor. 50 In
Rodrock, the creditors acquired rights in specific property prior to the enact-
ment of the Reform Act, and under Radford, such vested rights cannot be
taken from the creditor for the benefit of the debtor.51 By disallowing retro-
active application of the lien avoidance provisions of the Reform Act, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that a substantive right in spe-
cific property, such as a lien, cannot be substantially impaired by legislation
enacted after the right has been created without doing violence to the lien
holder's right to due process.
In re McCoy52 presented interesting questions under the Oklahoma auto-
mobile exemption statute53 and the Bankruptcy Act. Ted McCoy filed vol-
untary bankruptcy claiming a 1977 Cadillac as property physically exempt
from bankruptcy administration under section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act
54
and under the Oklahoma automobile exemption statute. 55 The bankruptcy
court rejected this claim holding that the Oklahoma statutory exemption
applies only to the owner's equity interest in the vehicle. 56 This holding was
not helpful to the bankrupt since McCoy's car was subject to an unperfected
security interest in favor of General Motors Acceptance Corporation
(GMAC). McCoy, GMAC, and the trustee stipulated that McCoy's indebt-
edness to GMAC exceeded the vehicle's market value, that is, that McCoy's
equity interest in the car was zero.
5 7
The district court reversed the bankruptcy court, holding that the vehi-
cle itself was exempt from bankruptcy administration because the bank-
48. 642 F.2d at 1196.
49. 295 U.S. 555 (1935). Radford involved an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act which
preserved to a defaulting mortgagor of farm property the ownership and enjoyment of his farm
and took from the mortgagee rights in specific property held as security.
50. Id. at 589.
51. 642 F.2d at 1197.
52. 643 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1981).
53. Id. at 685 n.2. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § I(A)(12) (West Supp. 1981-1982), provides:
§ 1. Property exempt from attachment, execution or other forced sale-Bankruptcy
proceedings A. Except as otherwise provided in this title and notwithstanding subsec-
tion B herein, the following property shall be reserved to every person residing in the
state, exempt from attachment or execution and every other species of forced sale for
the payment of debts, except as herein provided. . . . 12. Such person's interest, not
to exceed One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00) in value, in one (1) motor
vehicle.
54. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 6, 52 Stat. 883 (1938) (repealed 1979) (formerly codified at 11
U.S.C. § 24 (1976)).
55. 643 F.2d at 685.




rupt's equity interest was less than the $1,500 statutory exemption. 58 The
Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and upheld the bankruptcy court's
determination that the Oklahoma exemption statute applied only to the
bankrupt's equity interest in the car and not to the vehicle itself.59 The
Tenth Circuit relied on In re Cummings,60 a 1969 case which arose under the
Colorado exemption statute. 6 ' The Colorado statute at issue in Cummings
exempted the equity value of $750 worth of household goods owned and
used by the head of a family. The sellers of household goods in Cummings
wished to exempt certain goods from bankruptcy administration in which
the sellers had unperfected security interests. The Tenth Circuit disallowed
exempting the household goods from bankruptcy administration. The court
reasoned that to treat the exemption as extending to the household goods--
as opposed to the bankrupt's equity interest in the goods-would have the
effect of giving the lien holder a priority to which he was not entitled.
62
The Tenth Circuit therefore concluded that In re Cummings was disposi-
tive of the issue presented in In re McCqy. Thus, the Oklahoma automobile
exemption statute applies exclusively to a bankrupt's equity interest in an
automobile. If the bankrupt has no equity interest in the vehicle, then the
vehicle itself will be included in the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of gen-
eral creditors.
III. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The importance of including a description of collateral in security
agreements is emphasized in In re Permian Anchor Services, Inc.6 3 Permian
Anchor Services, Inc. was the bankrupt. The principal issue raised was the
relative priority of two creditors, the First National Bank of Lea County (the
Bank) and Marvel Engineering (Marvel), after the sale of the bankrupt's
assets. The Bank appealed from the district court's reversal of the bank-
ruptcy court. 64 The bankruptcy judge had awarded the Bank the proceeds
on sale of collateral described as miscellaneous equipment. 6 5
The Bank based its claim on a security agreement 6 6 and financing state-
ment. While the financing statement contained a description of equipment
58. Id.
59. Id. at 687.
60. 413 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. dented, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
61. &e CoLO. REV. STAT. § 77-2-2() (1963) (current version at CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
54-102(e) (1973)).
62. 413 F.2d at 1286.
63. 649 F.2d 763 (10th Cir. 1981).
64. Id. at 765.
65. Examination of the miscellaneous equipment disclosed: 6 augers, 2 belling tools, I
welder, 4 metal chairs, 2 filing cabinets, I butane bottle, I leased auger, and 4 collections of
unidentified items. Id. at 766.
66. The signed security agreement primarily covered drilling rigs and vehicles. These par-
ticular items were listed in an attachment to the security agreement entitled "Equipment List,
Permian Anchor Service, Inc." However, the equipment list failed to name a single item which
was of the same class as the miscellaneous items. Thus, the similarity of the "miscellaneous
equipment" to a drilling rig worth several thousand dollars more than any one of the items of
"miscellaneous equipment" was remote. Id. at 766-67.
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collateral, it omitted the address of the debtor.67 On the other hand, the
security agreement did list the debtor's address but was devoid of any collat-
eral description.6 The Bank urged that the signed financing statement and
the signed security agreement should be construed together in order to fulfill
the requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code.
69
The Tenth Circuit found the Bank's approach sensible. However, the
appellate court felt constrained to apply New Mexico common law, which
was contrary to the Bank's position. Jones & Laugh/'n Suppy v. Dugan Produc-
tion Corp., 7° a 1973 New Mexico case, held that where an unsigned financing
statement has a broader list of collateral than the security agreement has, the
security agreement controls.
The Bank sought to distinguishJones & Laughlin on the ground that in
the present case the financing statement was signed by the debtor. The
Tenth Circuit rejected the Bank's argument and, applyingJones &Laugh/in,
held: 1) the financing statement was invalid for lack of a debtor's address;
and 2) where the financing statement (which lacked the debtor's address)
listed equipment, but the security interest did not, the security agreement
controlled and therefore, no security agreement attached to the
equipment.
7'
An after-acquired property clause was at issue in Montoya v. Postal Credit
Union.72 Under the Truth in Lending Act 73 and Regulation Z, 74 a lender
must disclose the fact that a security interest covers after-acquired property.
The question was whether this is the extent of the obligation to disclose or if
state law variations as to the limits and effect of after-acquired property pro-
visions need also be described. The New Mexico Uniform Commercial Code
provides that a security interest including after-acquired property covers
only such property acquired by the borrower within ten days after the lender
"gives value." 75
Although the lender in Montoya stated that the security interest covered
after-acquired property, the plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the lender's
failure to disclose the ten-day limitation imposed by state law was a violation
of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z. 76 The Tenth Circuit found
the plaintiffs' assertion untenable and held that in a consumer loan transac-
tion, the disclosure that "[t]he Security Agreement secures further advances
and covers after-acquired property . . .77 is sufficient. The appellate court
also pointed out that state laws are part of a contract whether or not they are
67. Id. at 765.
68. Id.
69. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-9-203 to -204 (1978).
70. 85 N.M. 51, 508 P.2d 1348 (1973).
71. 649 F.2d at 766.
72. 630 F.2d 745 (10th Cir. 1980).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(8) (1976).
74. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(5) (1981).
75. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-204(4)(b) (1978).




referred to in the agreement.78
IV. CASE DIGESTS
In Solomon v. Pendaries Properties, Inc., 79 the purchasers of land in a New
Mexico development, Pendaries Village, sued the developer and its successor
for rescission of the land purchase contract. The Solomons' dissatisfaction
with their purchase of a lot arose from the failure of the developer, Pendaries
Properties, Inc. (PPI), to construct all the amenities it had represented would
be a part of the completed development.8 0 The purchasers sought rescission,
alleging fraud or intentional misrepresentation on the part of the devel-
oper. 8 ' The defendant, PPI, contended that the evidence was insufficient to
establish fraud or misrepresentation under either the Interstate Land Sales
Full Disclosure Act (the Land Sales Act)82 or the common law of New
Mexico.
Following a nonjury trial, the district court granted rescission to the
purchasers. 83 The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the Land Sales Act
as it existed at the time of this transaction 84 did not confer a cause of action
for the developer's failure to perform acts that, at the time of sale, it intended
in good faith to carry out.85 The appellate court also concluded that the
purchasers failed to prove a cause of action under the common law. New
78. Id. at 748 (citing Farmers Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U.S. 649 (1923); Von
Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1866)).
79. 623 F.2d 602 (10th Cir. 1980).
80. Id. at 602. In 1973, when the Solomons purchased land in Pendaries Village, the devel-
opment had a lodge, a swimming pool with cabana, and a twelve-hole golf course. The Solo-
mons received from PPI a report, as required by the Land Sales Act, and several other
communications describing the improvements of the completed project. The district court
found that PPI had represented in the property report that by December 1975 it would build
ten new lakes and ponds, an additional nine-hole golf course, eight tennis courts, a golf course
club house and pro shop, a security system, a saddle club area, a main lodge with additional
recreational facilities including a second swimming pool, camp-grounds, a complete water sys-
tem, and streets built to certain specifications. By the end of 1975, PPI had constructed two or
three ponds, the nine-hole golf course, two tennis courts, the golf pro shop, a partial security
system, some horse-riding facilities, a partial water system, and streets not built to specifications.
Id. at 603.
81. Id.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976).
83. 623 F.2d at 602.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976), as it existed at the time of this transaction, provided:
(a). It shall be unlawful for any developer or agent, directly or indirectly, to
make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in inter-
state commerce, or of the mails--(l) to sell or lease any lot in any subdivision unless a
statement of record with respect to such lot is in effect in accordance with section 1407
[1706] of this title and a printed property report, meeting the requirements of section
1408 [1707] of this title, is furnished to the purchaser in advance of the signing of any
contract or agreement for sale or lease by the purchaser; and (2) in selling or leasing, or
offering to sell or lease, any lot in a subdivision-(A) to employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, or (B) to obtain money or property by means of a material misrep-
resentation with respect to any information included in the statement of record or the
property report or with respect to any other information pertinent to the lot or the
subdivision and upon which the purchaser relies ....
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, tit. XIV, § 1404, 82 Stat. 591
(1968) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976)).
85. 623 F.2d at 604 (emphasis in original). The appellate court's review of the record




Mexico follows the general rule that a representation of future events is not
actionable fraud except when there is a misstatement of present intent.86 In
Solomon, there was no misstatement of present intent .
7
The Tenth Circuit also discussed the 1979 Congressional amendment to
section 1703 of the Land Sales Act. Although the amended language did not
control the transaction in Solomon, it added support to the court's decision.
Congress amended section 1703 in recognition of the problems created when
developers become bankrupt before completing promised amenities. 88 The
amendment provides a contractual basis for relief when roads, utilities, and
recreational amenities are not in fact completed by developers. The legisla-
tive history accompanying passage of the amendment explained that when-
ever a developer represents orally or in writing that roads, sewers, water or
electric service, or recreational amenities will be provided or completed by
the developer, the contract of sale or lease must stipulate that such services
or amenities will be provided or completed. 89 Under the amended Land
Sales Act, purchasers of land will have a statutory basis for suing a developer
if the land purchase contract fails to reflect the representations that were
made.
Southwestern Stationeg & Bank Supply, Inc. v. Harris Corp.9° dealt with an
acceptance clause in a purchase order. Southwestern wanted to purchase a
used printing press from Harris. Following a series of pre-offer contacts,
Harris sent Southwestern several copies of a Harris purchase order and also
-supplied instructions for submitting the order. 9' Southwestern completed
the purchase order and returned four copies to Harris, with a down payment
check and an irrevocable letter of credit for the balance of the purchase
price. Subsequently, Harris notified Southwestern that the third party own-
er of the used press would not release possession. Harris returned the un-
cashed check, the letter of credit, and three copies of the purchase order,
none of which bore any Harris notation of acceptance. 92 Southwestern then
purchased a comparable new printing press and instituted an action against
Harris for breach of the sales contract.
The case turned on the meaning of the acceptance clause language
printed on the back of the Harris purchase order. 93 Southwestern argued
that the method of acceptance was not made explicit by the document and,
86. Id. at 605 (citing Telman v. Galles, 41 N.M. 56, 63 P.2d 1049 (1936); W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 109, at 728-31 (4th ed. 1971)).
87. 623 F.2d at 604.
88. Id.
89. H.R. REP. No. 154, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 36, repnnnIedi'n [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2317, 2351-52.
90. 624 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1980).
91. Id. at 169.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 169-70. The acceptance clause read:
This order is subject to acceptance by Seller at its home office written herein. There-
upon, Seller shall mail to Purchaser a signed duplicate copy hereof, and the same shall
constitute the entire contract between the parties, which shall be changed only by
written agreement of the parties.
In addition, the purchase order included, on its face, the following signature block: "This order
is hereby accepted and dated at Seller's Cleveland, Ohio, Office on - HARRIS CORPO-
RATION, a Delaware Corporation Sheet Fed Press Division, Seller By -. "
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therefore, pursuant to section 2-206 of the Uniform Commercial Code, any
"reasonable manner of acceptance" would suffice. 94
Following a jury verdict for Southwestern, the district court entered a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict for Harris.9 5 The Tenth Circuit af-
firmed, holding that the seller's purchase order, which provided that the or-
der was "subject to acceptance by Seller" and that "Seller shall mail to
Purchaser a signed duplicate copy hereof, and the same shall constitute the
entire contract between the parties" 96 unambiguously indicated the method
of acceptance, and thus, in the absence of a written acceptance by the seller
(Harris), there was no contract for sale of the printing press.
97
Harrs reaffirms the time-honored rule that parties to a contract retain
the power to require specific methods of acceptance. Moreover, as the Tenth
Circuit pointed out, any well-trained lawyer can create ambiguities in inter-
preting even the most straightforward sentences. However, ambiguity does
not exist merely because care must be exercised in reading contract provi-
sions. The appellate court concluded that the language of the contract was
susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation: the signature block of the
purchase order clearly required signature by Harris for the contract to be
accepted. Since Harris unambiguously indicated the method of acceptance,
the other party was foreclosed from pointing to evidence that would estab-
lish any other "reasonable manner of acceptance" under section 2-206 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. 98
Steven W. Sackman
94. U.C.C. § 2-206 (adopted in Oklahoma as OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-206 (West
1971)).
95. 624 F.2d at 170.
96. Id. at 169-70.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 170.
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